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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important and risky investments a person can make is 
deciding to start a business. With so much potentially at risk, knowledge 
of exactly what features each type of business entity provides to owners—
including liability, taxation, and management flexibility—is essential to 
prospective business owners. Unfortunately, after the Louisiana Supreme 
Court’s decision in Ogea v. Merritt,1 the issue of personal liability for 
limited liability company (“LLC”) members is anything but clear.  
For instance, consider the following example involving two new 
Louisiana business owners—Lucky and Savvy. Lucky chooses to form an 
LLC and believes that the entity will provide the benefits of flow-through 
taxation,2 flexible management requirements, and limited liability3 for the 
debts of his business.4 Savvy chooses to form a corporation, which he 
elects to be taxed as an “S Corporation,” so he also expects to receive flow-
through taxation and limited liability.5 Both operate construction-
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2016, by THOMAS BOURGEOIS. 
 1. Ogea v. Merritt, 130 So. 3d 888 (La. 2013). 
 2. Flow-through taxation allows the income of the partnership to be taxed 
only once. The individual partners report the income of the partnership on their 
personal income tax returns, and the partnership itself does not pay income taxes 
on its income. 1 ARTHUR B. WILLIS & PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP TAX 
¶ 9.01[2] (7th ed. 2013). This avoids the problem that corporate shareholders have 
with double taxation—taxation of the income and taxation of the distributions to 
shareholders. Id. at ¶ 3.01[1]. 
 3. The phrase “limited liability” is a bit misleading. Although the phrase 
seems to imply that a business owner will have limited personal liability for the 
debts of the business, the shield actually provides limited risk to business owners. 
The owner is not personally liable for any amount of the debts of a business—
save a veil-piercing exception—and the owner’s risk is limited to his or her capital 
investment in the business. See infra Part I.B. 
 4. See infra Part I.A. 
 5. GLENN G. MORRIS & WENDELL H. HOLMES, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 
§ 41.01, in 8 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 405–07 (1999). 
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contracting businesses and enter into contracts on behalf of their respective 
companies to build new homes for two individuals. Lucky and Savvy both 
forget to pay their renewal fees for their state contractor’s licenses and 
therefore are not properly licensed, constituting a misdemeanor criminal 
offense.6 During construction, both Lucky and Savvy—sole owners and 
employees of their respective businesses—personally perform work that 
results in cracked foundations for each of the homes they contracted to 
build. 
Both homeowners sue, and Lucky and Savvy’s businesses become 
liable for damages under claims of breach of contract. Both companies 
have few assets, so the plaintiffs seek to recover against Lucky and Savvy 
personally for the damages. Louisiana Revised Statutes section 12:1-
622(B) makes clear that corporate shareholders in Louisiana are protected 
against personal liability for the debts of the corporation.7 Thus, absent a 
theory of recovery rendering him personally liable, such as a tort or the 
use of a veil-piercing theory, Savvy himself will not be liable for any of 
the damages.8 The contract was an obligation of Savvy’s business, not one 
he owed personally.9 
Lucky is, well, not so lucky. Although the LLC statute was intended 
to provide the same—if not stronger—protections to LLC members that 
its corporate counterpart provides to shareholders, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court interpreted and applied Revised Statutes section 12:1320 by creating 
a different and potentially weaker test for determining personal liability in 
Ogea. A lower court applying the test from Ogea could find Lucky 
personally liable under an “exception” to the limited liability shield 
provided to LLC members. One of the “factors” used to determine if one 
of the exceptions is met is “criminal conduct.”10 Therefore, a court could 
use Lucky’s misdemeanor improper licensing offense to find him 
personally liable for the damages resulting from his work on the home. 
Further, because Lucky personally performed the poor work, a court could 
find that his actions were tortious in nature even though the homeowner 
would likely not be capable of establishing a prima facie case under tort 
law.11 Thus, although Lucky’s facts are similar to those in Ogea, a lower 
                                                                                                             
 6. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:2160(B), (C) (2007 & Supp. 2015). 
 7. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-622(B) (2015). 
 8. See infra Part I.B (discussing the limited liability shield afforded to 
corporate shareholders and LLC members). 
 9. See Donnelly v. Handy, 415 So. 2d 478 (La. Ct. App. 1982); see also 
infra Part I.B (explaining the concept of limited liability, which provides 
protections to corporate shareholders as well as LLC members in most states). 
 10. Ogea v. Merritt, 130 So. 3d 888, 902–04 (La. 2013). 
 11. See infra Part IV.A.3.a. 
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court could weigh the factors differently than the Supreme Court, 
imposing personal liability on Lucky despite the plaintiff’s failure to prove 
all required elements of a cause of action. The reason for this discrepancy 
is because the Ogea Court’s test employs a case-by-case inquiry and, 
instead of using true causes of action, looks at “crime” and “tort” factors 
that are potentially present.12 
Although no justification exists for the contrasting theories of personal 
liability,13 this example illustrates what is now true in Louisiana: LLC 
members are treated differently from corporate shareholders for purposes 
of personal liability.14 This contradictory treatment creates a cloud of 
uncertainty for LLC owners and threatens to undermine the limited 
liability shield—one of the major advantages the LLC was created to 
provide.15 Thus, to supply clarity and certainty to current and prospective 
business owners, the Louisiana Legislature should amend Revised Statutes 
section 12:1320—which provides for the personal liability of LLC 
members—so that it mirrors Revised Statutes section 12:1-622 and the 
rules on personal liability of corporate shareholders.  
This Comment will explain the problems with Revised Statutes 
section 12:1320 and how the statute led to the Court’s unfortunate decision 
in Ogea. Part I will provide a brief history of LLCs and explain the 
advantages they provide to members. This Part will illustrate how the 
limited liability shield typically protects members in certain scenarios. Part 
II describes the Louisiana LLC and corporate statutes that determine 
personal liability of owners of those respective business entities. Part III 
will first explain how Louisiana courts wrestled with the language in 
Revised Statutes section 12:1320 before the Supreme Court’s first 
examination of limited liability in relation to LLCs in Ogea v. Merritt. This 
Part will then analyze the Court’s landmark holding in Ogea. Part IV 
provides an in-depth analysis of how Revised Statutes section 12:1320 led 
to the Supreme Court’s ambiguous and “all-encompassing” test, including 
potential ramifications of the decision. Part V argues that, to cure the 
                                                                                                             
 12. See id. at 905.  
 13. See Petch v. Humble, 939 So. 2d 499, 505 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (applying 
principles from a case analyzing personal liability of corporate shareholders to a 
case involving personal liability of LLC members); see also 1 CARTER G. BISHOP 
& DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS 
LAW ¶ 6.01[4] (2012); MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 5, § 44.06, at 495 (“LLCs 
are not different from corporations in any sense that would justify a different 
approach to such questions of personal liability.”). 
 14. Compare Donnelly v. Handy, 415 So. 2d 478 (La. Ct. App. 1982) 
(addressing personal liability of corporate shareholders), with Ogea, 130 So. 3d 
888 (addressing personal liability of LCC members). 
 15. See infra Part I.A. 
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uncertainty that the Louisiana Legislature and the Louisiana Supreme 
Court in Ogea created, the legislature should amend Revised Statutes 
section 12:1320 to mirror its corporate counterpart. 
I. THE HISTORY OF LLCS AND THE PROTECTIONS OF THE 
LIMITED LIABILITY SHIELD 
LLCs filled an important void for small businesses left open by 
corporations and partnerships by providing the limited liability traditionally 
associated with corporations in addition to the tax advantages and flexible 
managerial provisions of partnerships. These three appealing advantages 
create an enticing business entity for businesses large and small and have 
led to the LLC quickly becoming a prominent business organization 
despite being a relatively new entity type.16 
A. The Need for LLCs 
Prior to 1977 and the creation of LLCs, new business owners 
essentially chose between two types of businesses: partnerships and 
corporations.17 General and limited partnerships offered the advantages of 
flow-through taxation and flexible management but had no mechanism to 
limit the personal liability of general partners for debts of the business.18 
Corporations, on the other hand, did not provide shareholders with the 
same tax advantages and were subject to rigorous management 
requirements and formalities.19 They did, however, protect shareholders 
from personal liability for the debts of the corporation.20  
With the entities available to a business owner at the time, the best an 
owner could hope for was to obtain two out of the three desired advantages. 
To avoid the problems that each of these entity types presented, business 
owners began forming limited partnerships and naming a corporation as the 
                                                                                                             
 16. See Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill: An 
Empirical Study of the Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in 
the United States Between 2004-2007 and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years 
2002-2006, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 475–76 (2009) (noting that 82% 
of new domestic business filings in Louisiana and 58% nationwide were for LLCs 
between 2004 and 2007); Howard M. Friedman, The Silent LLC Revolution—The 
Social Cost of Academic Neglect, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 35, 37 (2004) (noting 
that 45% of business filings nationwide and 72% of business filings in Louisiana 
were for LLCs in 2003).  
 17. Friedman, supra note 16, at 40. 
 18. Id. at 40–44 (stating these reasons but acknowledging that they are a bit 
exaggerated). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
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sole general partner.21 The partnership protected the individual limited 
partners from being personally liable for the debts of the business.22 The 
only general partner—who alone was personally liable for all debts of the 
partnership23—was a minimally capitalized corporation that was often 
owned and managed by the limited partners.24 Under this model, no 
individual would be personally liable for debts of the business and the 
partners received flow-through taxation.25 This method, however, created 
extreme organizational complications and inserted rigorous corporate 
governance rules into partnerships. Thus, the strategy essentially provided 
limited liability and flow-through taxation but not flexible management. 
Business owners sought a simpler method that would provide all three 
advantages. 
Accordingly, in 1977, Wyoming became the first state to enact a 
statute allowing for the creation of LLCs.26 Due to uncertainty surrounding 
the tax implications of this new business entity, the LLC received little 
attention until 1988.27 That year, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) 
issued a Revenue Ruling stating that an LLC could be taxed as a 
partnership—with flow-through taxation—if the entity met certain 
conditions.28 After the IRS settled the tax implications, the popularity of 
LLCs spread quickly. By 1997, all 50 states had passed statutes providing 
for the creation of LLCs.29 LLCs have since become the “dominant form 
                                                                                                             
 21. Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate General Partners of Limited 
Partnerships, 1 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 73, 77–86 (1997). 
 22. Limited partnerships are called “partnerships in commendam” in 
Louisiana. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2844 (2014); see also GLENN G. MORRIS & 
WENDELL H. HOLMES, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, § 5.01, in 7 LOUISIANA CIVIL 
LAW TREATISE 176–80 (1999). 
 23. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2844 (2015) (stating that provisions of general 
partnership rules apply to partnerships in commendam); id. art. 2817 (stating that 
general partners are liable for their “virile share” of the debts of the partnership). 
 24. See Hamilton, supra note 21, at 79. 
 25. Id. at 79–80. 
 26. MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 5, § 44.06, at 483. 
 27. William J. Carney, Limited Liability Companies: Origins and 
Antecedents, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 855, 858–59 (1995). 
 28. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. The IRS originally established the tax 
status of a given LLC by determining whether the entity’s characteristics were 
more similar to a corporation or to a partnership. See id. The distinctions, 
however, became so blurred that this test was replaced with “check-the-box” 
regulations, which allow LLCs to choose their own tax status. 2 LARRY R. 
RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 16:4 (2003). 
 29. Richard M. Lipton & John T. Thomas, Impact of Final Check-the-Box 
Regulations Awaits Further IRS Guidance and States’ Input, 14 J. PARTNERSHIP 
TAX’N 91, 99 (1997). 
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of business organization in the United States”30 for closely held firms and 
have grown significantly faster than any other business type that provides 
limited liability to owners.31 LLCs are advantageous to members in many 
respects, particularly to owners of small businesses. They provide the 
flow-through taxation of a partnership, along with limited liability for 
members, and flexible management options that are well-suited to small 
businesses.32 
B. The Limited Liability Shield33 
Properly understood, “no member . . . of a limited liability company 
is liable in such capacity for a debt, obligation, or liability of the . . . 
company”34 unless a claimant establishes liability under a “veil-piercing” 
theory.35 The limited liability shield protects members from personal 
liability resulting solely from the member’s status as owner of the LLC.36 
LLC members, however, are generally not protected from any personal 
                                                                                                             
 30. NICHOLAS KARAMBELAS, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: LAW, 
PRACTICE AND FORMS § 6.2 (2d ed., Supp. 2013). 
 31. Chrisman, supra note 16, at 475–76; Friedman, supra note 16, at 37. 
 32. Friedman, supra note 16, at 43–44; see also id. at 49–55; MORRIS & 
HOLMES, supra note 5, § 44.01, at 483 (“[LLC] statutes are designed to achieve 
the basic objective of a partnership-like entity that confers corporate-like limited 
liability.”); Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application of Limited 
Liability Company Acts—Issues Relating to Personal Liability of Members, 47 
A.L.R.6TH 1, 1 (West, Westlaw through 2009). 
 33. This Comment refers to a “correct” determination of personal liability 
several times. A “correct” determination of personal liability for members follows 
the process outlined in this part of the Comment. The limited liability shield 
described here is the proper and generally accepted theory of the protections 
provided to shareholders and members. 
 34. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1320(B) (2010). 
 35. Wooster, supra note 32, § 16 (“Only in narrowly defined circumstances 
can an individual member of a limited liability company (LLC) be subject to 
personal liability for obligations for which the LLC would be solely liable; similar 
to the concept of ‘piercing the corporate veil,’ these exceptions may be 
characterized as ‘piercing the company veil.’”). Generally, corporations and LLCs 
are treated as separate legal entities, hence the theory behind the limited liability 
shield. See MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 5, § 32.01, at 50–52. Courts use “veil-
piercing” theories to disregard the separate personality of the owners and treat the 
two as one “person” to impose liability on an owner for a debt that would normally 
only be a liability of the business. See id. 
 36. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 13, ¶ 6.01[1] (comparing the 
personal liability of sole proprietors and partners to that of members to which no 
personal liability attaches “merely from the status as ‘owner’”). 
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obligations that may arise from conduct they undertake in connection with 
the LLC’s business.37 Members can become personally liable for these 
types of actions under several bodies of law including, but not limited to, 
contract, tort, and agency.38 The relevant inquiry for a court in determining 
a member’s personal liability is whether the member would be liable for 
the actions in question if he were not an owner of the business but rather a 
non-member employee or agent.39 In contrast, sole proprietors and general 
partners are personally liable for the debts of their businesses simply 
because of their status as owners.40 
A common and easily understood hypothetical for demonstrating the 
protections of the limited liability shield involves an employee of a 
business delivering a package for his or her employer. While driving a car 
to make the delivery, the employee carelessly hits a pedestrian crossing 
the street. The employee is obviously liable to the pedestrian for his 
negligence under a tort theory, assuming the other tort elements are 
present, because the employee has a personal duty not to hit the 
pedestrian.41 The business will also likely face liability under a theory of 
vicarious liability because the employee was in the course and scope of his 
employment when the accident occurred.42 The business will be 
vicariously liable regardless of the entity type. If the business were a sole 
                                                                                                             
 37. Id. at ¶ 6.04 (“[T]he shield provides no protection when a member 
engages in actionable conduct. Liability in those circumstances can arise under 
both common law and statutory rule, and the fact that a member’s conduct is in 
connection with, or even in the service of, an LLC will not negate liability.”). 
 38. See id. (providing an explanation of the numerous ways in which a 
member can be liable); see also Wooster, supra note 32, §§ 10–16; RIBSTEIN & 
KEATINGE, supra note 28, § 12:4 (providing general rules and examples). 
 39. This concept will be explained further in the example below. 
 40. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2817 (2015); see also BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, 
supra note 13, ¶ 6.01[1] (comparing the personal liability of sole proprietors and 
partners to that of members to which no personal liability attaches “merely from 
the status as ‘owner’”); MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 22, § 6.06, at 246. 
 41. More generally, it could be said that the employee has a duty to operate 
the vehicle in a responsible manner or simply with due care. Whatever 
formulation of the duty is used, the result is the same—the driver owed a tort duty 
to the pedestrian. 
 42. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2320; Timmons v. Silman, 761 So. 2d 507, 510 
(La. 2000); see also WILLIAM E. CRAWFORD, TORT LAW § 9:11, in 12 LOUISIANA 
CIVIL LAW TREATISE 145–47 (2000). Additionally, the business’s vicarious 
liability does not affect the employee’s personal liability for the tort. The two 
become solidary obligors to the victim and both remain liable despite having 
different legal sources of liability. Narcise v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 427 So. 2d 
1192, 1194 (La. 1983); see also CRAWFORD, supra, § 8:2, at 134–35. 
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proprietorship or a general partnership, the owner or owners of the 
business would be personally liable for the business’s debt—a tort 
judgment—just as they would be for any of its other debts because those 
entities do not provide limited liability for their owners.43  
If the business were an LLC or a corporation, however, the members 
or shareholders would not be personally liable to the pedestrian.44 This is 
within the scope of the limited liability shield—protecting owners from 
liability arising solely from their status as owners. But if the driver were 
also an owner of the LLC or corporation, he or she would be liable to the 
pedestrian.45 The fact that an employee is also an owner of the business 
does not absolve the employee of liability for his or her own tortious 
conduct; this liability does not result from the member’s ownership of the 
business, but rather because he committed a tort.46 The limited liability 
shield does not provide any form of immunity to owners for their personal 
obligations, but merely protects owners from the entity’s liabilities.47 Even 
if the member acted in his or her capacity as a member or in fulfillment of 
an employment duty owed to the LLC, the limited liability shield would 
not protect the member from liability because the obligation resulting from 
the member’s careless driving is personal and belongs to the member.48  
LLCs are an extremely important new form of business. They provide 
their members with an entity type better suited for small businesses than 
                                                                                                             
 43. Owners of those types of businesses are liable for the debt and obligations 
of the business simply because of their status as owner. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 
2817; see also BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 13, ¶ 6.01[1] (comparing the 
personal liability of sole proprietors and partners to that of members to which no 
personal liability attaches “merely from the status as ‘owner’”); MORRIS & HOLMES, 
supra note 22, § 6.06, at 246. 
 44. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 13, ¶ 6.01[1] (comparing the 
personal liability of sole proprietors and partners to that of members to which no 
personal liability attaches “merely from the status as ‘owner’”). 
 45. Id. at ¶ 6.04 (“The shield provides no protection when a member engages 
in actionable conduct. Liability in those circumstances can arise under both 
common law and statutory rule, and the fact that a member’s conduct is in 
connection with, or even in the service of, an LLC will not negate liability.”). 
 46. The owner’s personal liability is not affected by the fact that the business 
may be vicariously liable for his tortious conduct because he is an employee, just 
as a non-owner employee would remain liable in the same scenario. See Narcise, 
427 So. 2d at 1194; see also CRAWFORD, supra note 42, § 8:2, at 134–35.  
 47. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 13, ¶ 6.04 (“The LLC liability shield 
relates only to liability arising from a member’s status as member.”). 
 48. Id. (“The shield provides no protection when a member engages in 
actionable conduct. Liability in those circumstances can arise under both common 
law and statutory rule, and the fact that a member’s conduct is in connection with, 
or even in the service of, an LLC will not negate liability.”). 
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the traditional business organizations.49 One of the main advantages of the 
entity is to provide corporate-like limited liability to owners.50 
Unfortunately, in Louisiana, the legislature chose language in the statute 
pertaining to member liability that leads to a large disconnect between 
personal liability for owners of LLCs and that of shareholders of a 
corporation. 
II. LOUISIANA’S CONTRASTING LIMITED LIABILITY STATUTES FOR 
CORPORATE SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS 
The Louisiana Legislature joined the national LLC trend by enacting 
legislation permitting the formation of these important new entities in 
1992.51 Unfortunately, the provision in the statute that addresses the 
personal liability of members, Revised Statutes section 12:1320, contains 
overly broad language. That language eventually led to the Supreme 
Court’s misguided test for determining a member’s personal liability. The 
legislature’s choice of language also created unnecessary, superficial 
differences between the LLC statute and its corporate counterparts.  
Because one of the intentions behind the creation of LLCs was to 
provide members with the same limited liability associated with 
corporations,52 the corporate statutes relating to limited liability in force at 
the time the LLC statutes were enacted are a useful starting place. The 
corporate statute in effect at the time was relatively simple, stating, “[a] 
shareholder of a corporation . . . shall not be liable personally for any debt 
or liability of the corporation.”53 The only other relevant provision in the 
corporate chapter preserved liability for shareholders who committed 
fraud on a third party.54 This was a narrow no-derogation provision, only 
                                                                                                             
 49. See supra Part. I.A. 
 50. Friedman, supra note 16, at 44 (“The limited liability company offers the 
default rules of partnership along with limited liability.”); MORRIS & HOLMES, 
supra note 5, § 44.01, at 483 (“[LLC] statutes are designed to achieve the basic 
objective of a partnership-like entity that confers corporate-like limited liability.”). 
 51. Act No. 780, 1993 La. Acts 2031, 2083–153; see also MORRIS & 
HOLMES, supra note 5, § 44.01, at 482–83. 
 52. Friedman, supra note 16, at 44; MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 5, § 44.01, 
at 483. 
 53. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:93(B) (2010) (repealed 2014).  
 54. Id. § 12:95 (repealed 2014). Importantly, the no-derogation provision was 
not necessary to impose liability on shareholders who committed fraud. These 
shareholders would be liable for any fraud they personally committed because 
they owe a personal duty not to act in this manner such that the limited liability 
shield would not protect them from liability. See supra Part I.B (explaining that 
the limited liability shield does not protect LLC members from liability for their 
own tortious conduct). 
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applying to fraud. Courts rarely used this provision and never considered 
the statute to be the sole source of liability for corporate shareholders. In 
fact, courts routinely ignored this provision and held members liable under 
the traditional limited liability shield doctrine.55 In contrast, the language 
of Revised Statutes section 12:1320 appears to provide a more 
“bulletproof” protection for LLC members than the then-current corporate 
statute.56 
The LLC statute contains three relevant provisions—an exclusivity 
provision, a no-liability provision, and a no-derogation provision. The 
exclusivity provision, Subsection A, provides that “[t]he liability of 
members, managers, employees, or agents, as such, of a limited liability 
company organized and existing under this Chapter shall at all times be 
determined solely and exclusively by the provisions of this Chapter.”57 
Subsection B states the no-liability rule, providing: “[e]xcept as otherwise 
specifically set forth in this Chapter, no member, manager, employee, or 
agent of a limited liability company is liable in such capacity for a debt, 
obligation, or liability of the limited liability company.”58 In addition, 
Subsection C makes LLC participants improper parties to litigation 
involving the LLC, save internal disputes.59 The statute then continues 
with the no-derogation provision, Subsection D, stating: 
Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed as being in derogation 
of any rights which any person may by law have against a 
member, manager, employee, or agent of a limited liability 
company because of any fraud practiced upon him, because of any 
breach of professional duty or other negligent or wrongful act by 
such person, or in derogation of any right which the limited 
                                                                                                             
 55. See, e.g., H. B. “Buster” Hughes, Inc. v. Bernard, 318 So. 2d 9, 12 (La. 
1975); Donnelly v. Handy, 415 So. 2d 478, 479–80 (La. Ct. App. 1982). 
 56. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:93(B) (repealed 2014) (stating simply that “[a] 
shareholder of a corporation organized after January 1, 1929, shall not be liable 
personally for any debt or liability of the corporation”); see also MORRIS & 
HOLMES, supra note 5, § 44.06, at 493–96. 
 57. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1320(A). 
 58. Id. § 12:1320(B). 
 59. Id. § 12:1320(C) (“A member, manager, employee, or agent of a limited 
liability company is not a proper party to a proceeding by or against a limited 
liability company, except when the object is to enforce such a person’s rights 
against or liability to the limited liability company.”). This provision appears to 
severely limit a LLC member’s exposure to liability, but is rarely invoked as the 
jurisprudence in the area rarely, if ever, discusses it. 
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liability company may have against any such person because of 
any fraud practiced upon it by him.60 
Subsections A and B illustrate that the legislature clearly intended for 
Revised Statutes section 12:1320 to be a “one-stop shop” for determining 
a member’s liability. This intent is evident from the use of language such 
as “solely and exclusively” and “[e]xcept as otherwise specifically set 
forth in this Chapter.”61 When the statute was originally enacted, its effects 
were potentially even more far reaching because it did not contain the 
scope-limiting words “as such” in Subsection A or “in such capacity” in 
Subsection B.62 
The no-derogation rule in Subsection D does not explicitly create or 
limit any causes of action that a claimant may have against a member.63 
Seemingly, the legislature added Subsection D to avoid a scenario in 
which the professional corporation statutes would expressly preserve 
liability for professional misconduct while the parallel LLC statute 
remained silent. Because the legislature intended for professionals to have 
the ability to form LLCs, the legislature simply copied the language from 
the existing professional corporation statutes64 into the new LLC statute to 
avoid the risk that the omission would lead a court to interpret the statute 
as protecting professional LLC members from malpractice claims.65 The 
                                                                                                             
 60. Id. § 12:1320(D). 
 61. Id. § 12:1320(A), (B). This language will be referred to in this Comment 
as the “exclusivity language.” 
 62. Act No. 475, 1993 La. Acts 1177, 1183. 
 63. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1320(D) (“Nothing in this Chapter shall be 
construed as being in derogation of any rights . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 64. The state’s corporate law is divided into several chapters. The discussion 
of the repealed shareholder liability statute earlier in this Part is in reference to the 
business corporation statutes found in Louisiana Revised Statutes Title 12, 
Chapter 1. The Revised Statutes set out a separate set of rules for each 
“professional” corporation type—such as professional law or medical 
corporations—found in Title 12, Chapters 8 through 12, 14 through 21, and 23. 
 65. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:807 (“Nothing in this Chapter shall 
be construed as in derogation of any rights which any person may by law have 
against an incorporator, subscriber, shareholder, director, officer of agent of the 
corporation, because of any fraud practiced upon him, or because of any breach 
of professional duty or other negligent or wrongful act, by such person . . . .”). 
Although only a subsidiary issue in this Comment, Subsection D’s language 
creates a large problem in the LLC context. In the professional corporation 
statutes, the subsection’s source, each statute clearly preserves liability for a 
particular “professional duty” because each professional corporation chapter 
pertains to only one identified profession. But in the LLC context, the 
“professional duties” that the statute refers to and the types of “professions” that 
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exclusivity language in the statute, however, has led to an interpretation 
that this language is an attempt to list the exclusive causes of actions for 
which members may become personally liable for a business debt.66 The 
professional corporation statutes do not contain exclusivity provisions,67 
so courts have never interpreted these statutes as providing the only 
available source of liability for professional shareholders. 
In contrast, the recently enacted corporate statute governing the 
personal liability of shareholders for debts of corporations is more 
straightforward than both the parallel LLC statute and the prior corporate 
statute. The new statute simply states, “[a] shareholder of a corporation is 
not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation.”68 When 
adopting the statute from the Model Business Corporation Act section 
6.22, the legislature chose to delete the phrase “except that [the 
shareholder] may become personally liable by reason of his own acts or 
conduct” from the end of the sentence.69 The reason for the deletion, as 
stated in a comment to the statute, was that the phrase “could have been 
interpreted to provide an independent basis for personal liability based 
simply on a corporate actor’s having engaged in some kind of personal 
conduct in connection with the corporation’s operations.”70 The comment 
acknowledges that a shareholder could still be held liable for personal 
conduct if, for example, the acts amount to a tort.71 The comment clarifies 
that bodies of law other than corporate law—including tort law, contract 
law, and agency law—should determine liability.72 The comment further 
states that if a court holds a shareholder personally liable for “personal acts 
                                                                                                             
are included in the definition of “business” are not clear because there is no list of 
those professions anywhere in the LLC chapter. Although a very important issue, 
whether any type of tradesman that is not included in one of the professional 
corporation chapters is or should be considered a professional under the LLC 
chapter is outside the scope of this article. For two cases looking at this issue, see 
Syzygy Construction, L.L.C. v. McKey, 156 So. 3d 763, 768–69 (La. Ct. App. 
2014), and Nunez v. Pinnacle Homes, L.L.C., 158 So. 3d 71, 75–76 (La. Ct. App. 
2014).  
 66. See, e.g., Ogea v. Merritt, 130 So. 3d 888, 896 (La. 2013); Hooper v. 
Wisteria Lakes Subdivision, 135 So. 3d 9, 20 (La. Ct. App. 2013); Regions Bank 
v. Ark-La-Tex Water Gardens, L.L.C., 997 So. 2d 734, 740 (La. Ct. App. 2008); 
Petch v. Humble, 939 So. 2d 499, 503–05 (La. Ct. App. 2006); see also infra Part 
III.A.2. 
 67. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:807. 
 68. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-622(B) (2015). 
 69. Id. at cmt. a. 
 70. Id. at cmt. c. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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or conduct in connection with the operation of the corporation, the 
[shareholder] is being held liable for his own acts or debts, not those of the 
corporation, so no need exists to state the exception.”73 
A comparison of the corporate and LLC owner liability statute reveals 
several major differences. For example, Revised Statutes section 12:1320 
provides that personal liability of members should be found only by 
reference to the LLC chapter; the corporate statute contains no parallel 
limitation. Further, the LLC statute also purports to determine liability for 
managers, employees, and agents of the business, yet the corporate statute 
merely limits liability for shareholders. Additionally, Revised Statutes 
section 12:1320(D) attempts to preserve liability for members under 
certain theories, while the analogous general business corporation statute 
contains no such preservations.74 Unfortunately, the differing language 
contained in Revised Statutes section 12:1320 serves as the basis for 
numerous misapplications of the limited liability shield to LLC members. 
III. JURISPRUDENCE ON PERSONAL LIABILITY OF LLC MEMBERS 
The many Louisiana appellate court decisions interpreting the far-
reaching language of Revised Statutes section 12:1320 highlight the 
uncertainty the statute has created. Even with a large body of corporate 
jurisprudence to borrow from, the courts continuously come up short in 
determining a member’s liability due to the differences in the statute’s 
language. Despite this jurisprudential confusion, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court did not address personal liability of LLC members until 2013 in 
Ogea v. Merritt.75  
A. Comparing Pre-Ogea LLC Cases with Corporate Cases 
No Louisiana court has been able to properly articulate the 
circumstances under which an LLC member should be held personally 
liable, largely due to the deficiencies of Revised Statutes section 
                                                                                                             
 73. Id. 
 74. The corporation chapters of the Louisiana Revised Statutes are split into 
several major types. The important distinctions for this Comment are between the 
general business corporation chapter and the professional corporation chapters. 
The general business corporation statute—Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
12:1-622—does not contain this preservation language. The professional 
corporation statutes do contain this language. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
12:807 (2010). 
 75. Ogea v. Merritt, 130 So. 3d 888 (La. 2013). 
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12:1320.76 However, because there is no justification to treat LLC 
members and corporate shareholders differently in terms of personal 
liability, jurisprudence interpreting the liability of corporate shareholders 
is helpful in providing a model analysis for how the limited liability shield 
should apply to LLC members in Louisiana.77  
1. Traditional Corporate Analysis of Shareholder Liability 
Donnelly v. Handy is an enlightening corporate liability case, 
addressing whether the sole shareholder of a small construction 
corporation could be liable for negligent supervision and defective 
construction.78 Handy, the defendant, signed a contract on behalf of his 
corporation to build a home for Donnelly, the plaintiff.79 Donnelly filed 
suit after disputes arose between the parties about the quality of the work.80 
After acknowledging that shareholders cannot be liable for debts of the 
business, the court looked for distinct theories under which Handy could 
be personally liable outside of corporate law.81  
Initially, the court stated that Handy could not be liable for breach of 
contract because the contract was between the corporation and the 
plaintiff, and Handy signed only in his capacity as president.82 The court 
then looked at whether Handy could be held liable for negligence83 and 
held that a shareholder could only be personally liable to a third party for 
a tort if the shareholder owed a personal tort duty to the third party.84 The 
                                                                                                             
 76. See infra Part IV (discussing these deficiencies and how they led to the 
Ogea holding). 
 77. See supra Part I.A (discussing the advantages of LLCs, including 
“corporate-like” limited liability); see also Ogea, 130 So. 3d at 901 (“LLCs are 
not different from corporations in any sense that would justify a different 
approach to such questions of personal liability.” (quoting MORRIS & HOLMES, 
supra note 5, § 44.06, at 495)); Petch v. Humble, 939 So. 2d 499, 505 (La. Ct. 
App. 2006) (applying principles from a case analyzing personal liability of 
corporate shareholders to determine personal liability of LLC members). 
 78. Donnelly v. Handy, 415 So. 2d 478, 479–80 (La. Ct. App. 1982). 
 79. Id. at 479. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 479–80. 
 84. Id. at 480. This is known as the “personal duty” theory. See H. B. “Buster” 
Hughes, Inc. v. Bernard, 318 So. 2d 9, 12 (La. 1975); Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 
So. 2d 716, 720 (La. 1973); Manning v. United Med. Corp. of New Orleans, 902 
So. 2d 406, 410–11 (La. Ct. App. 2005); 13 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, 
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court further explained that if a shareholder injures a third party through a 
breach of that duty, the shareholder is personally liable “whether or not the 
act culminating in the injury is committed by or for the corporation . . . 
and it does not matter that liability might also attach to the corporation.”85 
The court found that Handy did not owe a personal duty to the plaintiff to 
provide quality construction work or to properly supervise the 
corporation’s employees.86 Instead, Handy merely owed a duty to the 
corporation that he worked for, not to its customer.87 Conversely, the 
corporation owed a contractual duty to the plaintiff to provide quality work 
and to supervise its employees.88 Therefore, the court found the 
corporation—but not Handy—liable.89 The analysis in Donnelly is well-
reasoned and follows the typical framework used in cases adjudicating a 
corporate shareholder’s personal liability. 
2. Lower Courts’ Attempts at Analyzing LLC Member Liability 
When adjudicating the personal liability of LLC members, however, 
courts have not provided such a technically sound analysis. Many 
appellate courts have interpreted Revised Statutes section 12:1320(D) as 
providing an exclusive list of the causes of actions under which a court 
may hold a member personally liable.90 This interpretation of the statute 
differs from the corporate jurisprudence where courts simply look to 
standalone theories of liability that exist outside of corporate law rather 
than a list of exceptions.91 Perhaps this is because the shareholder liability 
                                                                                                             
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 6214, at 441–42 (2004 
& Supp. 2008). 
 85. Donnelly, 415 So. 2d at 481 (quoting H. B. “Buster” Hughes, Inc., 318 
So. 2d at 12). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. The duty was to properly “supervise, inspect, govern, control and 
manage the construction” and resulted from being an employee of the corporation. 
Id. 
 88. Id. at 481–82. 
 89. Id. at 482. 
 90. See, e.g., Hooper v. Wisteria Lakes Subdivision, 135 So. 3d 9, 20 (La. Ct. 
App. 2013); Regions Bank v. Ark-La-Tex Water Gardens, L.L.C., 997 So. 2d 734, 
740 (La. Ct. App. 2008); Petch v. Humble, 939 So. 2d 499, 503–05 (La. Ct. App. 
2006).  
 91. See, e.g., H. B. “Buster” Hughes, Inc. v. Bernard, 318 So. 2d 9, 12 (La. 
1975) (analyzing tort liability of a corporate shareholder); Chaney v. Godfrey, 535 
So. 2d 918, 921–23 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (analyzing liability of corporate 
shareholders under agency theories); Donnelly, 415 So. 2d at 481. 
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statute provides no similar list and no exclusivity provision.92 Although 
one old corporate statute did contain a narrow no-derogation provision for 
fraud,93 the courts never viewed this as the sole potential source of 
liability94—likely because of the lack of an exclusivity provision.95 
Additionally, many appellate courts have also interpreted the exclusivity 
language and the words “in such capacity” to mean that a member cannot 
be held personally liable for any of the “exceptions” in Subsection D 
unless the member was acting “outside” of his or her capacity as 
member.96 This too diverges from the corporate jurisprudence where a 
shareholder’s “capacity” does not affect a court’s determination of 
personal liability.97  
Further problems have arisen when courts interpret the “breach of 
professional duty” language in Subsection D. In several cases, plaintiffs 
sued members of construction LLCs alleging personal liability for faulty 
                                                                                                             
 92. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-622(B) (2015). 
 93. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:95 (2010) (repealed 2014). The new corporate 
shareholder liability statute does not contain any no-derogation provisions. LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-622 (2015). 
 94. See, e.g., Donnelly, 415 So. 2d at 479–82 (addressing potential personal 
liability of a corporate shareholder under contract and tort theories). 
 95. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:93(B) (2010) (repealed 2014). 
 96. See, e.g., Hooper v. Wisteria Lakes Subdivision, 135 So. 3d 9, 20 (La. Ct. 
App. 2013) (“The evidence in the record revealed that all actions taken by [the 
members] with regard to the [plaintiff’s] property . . . were in their capacities as 
members or agents of [the LLC]. Hence, they are not personally liable for any 
debt, obligation or liability of [the LLC].”); Regions Bank v. Ark-La-Tex Water 
Gardens, L.L.C., 997 So. 2d 734, 740 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (finding liability where 
the member “was not acting solely in his capacity as a member of the limited 
liability company”); Petch v. Humble, 939 So. 2d 499, 504 (La. Ct. App. 2006) 
(“To have meaning within the statute, the phrase ‘or other negligent or wrongful 
act by such person’ must refer to acts that are either done outside one’s capacity 
as a member . . . of a limited liability company or which while done in one’s 
capacity as a member . . . of a limited liability company also violate some personal 
duty owed by the individual to the injured party.”); Curole v. Ochsner Clinic, 
L.L.C., 811 So. 2d 92, 97 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (“To have meaning within the entire 
statute, the phrase ‘or other negligent or wrongful act by such person’ must refer 
to acts done outside one’s capacity as a member, manager, employee, or agent of 
the limited liability company.”). 
 97. See, e.g., H. B. “Buster” Hughes, Inc. v. Bernard, 318 So. 2d 9 (La. 1975) 
(analyzing tort liability of a corporate shareholder); Chaney v. Godfrey, 535 So. 
2d 918 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (analyzing liability of corporate shareholders under 
agency theories); Donnelly, 415 So. 2d at 481. 
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or poor workmanship on work the member actually completed.98 In those 
cases, the courts strongly implied that they were holding the members 
liable under the “breach of professional duty exception” but did not 
expressly do so.99 Rather, these courts held the members personally liable 
by stating that they were “negligent”—violating the standard of care100—
in performing the work without establishing any specific duty owed to the 
claimants.101 In corporate cases with similar facts, courts focused on 
whether the shareholder who performed the faulty work owed a tort duty 
to the plaintiff, not solely on whether their acts violated the standard of 
care or whether the members were acting as professionals.102 In the 
corporate context, contractors are not professionals, and therefore, the 
shareholders in construction liability cases will not be liable to their 
customers for poor work absent a veil-piercing theory because they owe 
no personal duty. 
The tension between traditional applications of the limited liability 
shield and the language in Revised Statutes section 12:1320 has long been 
                                                                                                             
 98. See, e.g., Matherne v. Barnum, 94 So. 3d 782, 785–86 (La. Ct. App. 
2012); Regions Bank, 997 So. 2d 734, 736; W.J. Spano Co. v. Mitchell, 943 So. 
2d 1131, 1131–32 (La. Ct. App. 2006). 
 99. See Matherne, 94 So. 3d at 788–90; Regions Bank, 997 So. 2d at 740–41; 
W.J. Spano Co., 943 So. 2d at 1133. 
 100. In a typical negligence tort case in Louisiana, the plaintiff must prove the 
following elements: (1) a duty, (2) a breach of that duty (negligence), (3) that the 
breach was the cause in fact of the harm, and (4) the actual injury. See CRAWFORD, 
supra note 42, § 4:2, at 76–78. In these cases, the courts did not address the 
presence of all of these elements. They held the member–contractor liable because 
the member breached—was negligent and violated the standard of care—but 
skipped the question of whether there was a duty owed that could be breached in 
the first place. This may not have changed the result of the cases because the 
courts could have found that the contractors were professionals and therefore 
owed a tort duty to the plaintiffs. By not expressly holding so, however, the courts 
left gaping holes in their analyses. 
 101. See Matherne, 94 So. 3d at 788–90; Regions Bank, 997 So. 2d at 740–41; 
W.J. Spano Co., 943 So. 2d at 1133. 
 102. See, e.g., Donnelly, 415 So. 2d at 479–80; see also H. B. “Buster” 
Hughes, Inc., 318 So. 2d at 10–12. In Nunez v. Pinnacle Homes, L.L.C., the 
Supreme Court held that licensed contractors were not professionals as 
contemplated by the LLC chapter. No. 2015-C-0087, 2015 WL 5972529 (La. Oct. 
14, 2015). This Comment does not seek to address the merits of either side of that 
debate. For the purposes of this Comment, the important issue is not whether a 
contractor is a “professional” as contemplated by the LLC chapter, but the manner 
in which the courts used the professional liability preservation in Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 12:1320(D) to hold members liable without establishing 
a personal tort duty. 
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apparent. The above cases demonstrate how the lower courts attempted to 
solve the mysteries created by the statutory language, although almost all 
attempts have resulted in legally unsound analyses. The lower courts acted 
with no guidance from the Supreme Court until Ogea, which unfortunately 
did little to clear the ambiguities surrounding the statute.  
B. The Breaking Point: Ogea v. Merritt 
Ogea involved a contract between the plaintiff, Ogea, and a 
construction contracting business, Merritt LLC.103 The latter agreed to 
build a new home for Ogea.104 Travis Merritt, the sole member of the LLC, 
personally prepared the dirt “pad” over which the concrete slab for the 
home would be poured.105 Upon realizing that the completed slab 
contained significant defects, Ogea sued both Merritt LLC and Merritt 
personally for violations of the New Home Warranty Act106 and Civil Code 
articles related to construction defects.107 The trial court held that “‘[u]nder 
one or more of the [legal] theories,’ the damages . . . were caused either 
by Merritt LLC or Mr. Merritt or both.”108 Specifically as to Merritt, the 
trial court held that he was personally liable because he performed the 
negligent work on the pad himself and that his failure to produce an 
insurance policy upon Ogea’s request constituted fraud.109  
The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s 
decision to hold Merritt personally liable for the construction defects.110 
Merritt argued that because the contract was between the LLC and Ogea, 
he should not be personally liable for the LLC’s breach.111 Conversely, 
Ogea argued that because Merritt personally completed or supervised all 
of the work on the pad, he should be personally liable for the poor 
workmanship.112  
Relying on language in the LLC chapter, the court reasoned that “the 
legislature intended for the personal liability of LLC members to be 
                                                                                                             
 103. Ogea v. Merritt, 130 So. 3d 888, 892 (La. 2013). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id.  
 106. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3141 to :3150 (2009). 
 107. Ogea v. Merritt, 109 So. 3d 516, 518 (La. Ct. App. 2013). 
 108. Id. at 519. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 523, 528. 
 111. Id. at 521. 
 112. Id. 
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different from the personal liability of corporate shareholders.”113 
According to the court, under Revised Statutes section 12:1320, members 
received limited liability for the debts of the LLC as long as the debt or 
liability at issue was not caused by the member’s own actions that would 
constitute an “exception” under Subsection D.114 The court then 
determined that Merritt was negligent in preparing the dirt for the home 
and therefore was personally liable to Ogea for the damages even though 
they were a result of the LLC’s breach of contract.115 Under this analysis, 
a member of an LLC could be held liable for the business’s debt if his or 
her conduct was the source of the defective performance regardless of 
whether the member owed a personal duty to the injured party. This 
analysis differs significantly from the typical inquiry to determine the 
liability of corporate shareholders—whether the person owed a personal 
duty to the claimant.116  
The Louisiana Supreme Court subsequently granted writs and 
reversed the portion of the Third Circuit’s decision holding Merritt 
personally liable.117 In its first interpretation of Revised Statutes section 
12:1320, however, the Court implicitly agreed with the Third Circuit that 
the legislature intended to provide a different and weaker form of 
protection against personal liability to the members of an LLC than that 
provided to the shareholders of a corporation.118 
The Court began its analysis by recognizing that LLCs are juridical 
persons and are legally distinct from their owners.119 The Court then 
                                                                                                             
 113. Id. at 522. Specifically, the Third Circuit stated that it was precluded from 
looking at the law pertaining to corporate shareholders because the LLC chapter 
explicitly stated that LLCs were unincorporated associations and because the 
exclusivity language in Louisiana Revised Statutes section 12:1320(D) prevented 
it from looking anywhere outside of LLC law. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 523–24. 
 116. See, e.g., H. B. “Buster” Hughes, Inc. v. Bernard, 318 So. 2d 9, 12 (La. 
1975); Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So. 2d 716, 720 (La. 1973); Manning v. 
United Med. Corp. of New Orleans, 902 So. 2d 406, 410–11 (La. Ct. App. 2005); 
Donnelly v. Handy, 415 So. 2d 478, 480 (La. Ct. App. 1982); see also FLETCHER, 
supra note 84, § 6214, at 441–42; supra Part I.B. 
 117. Ogea v. Merritt, 130 So. 3d 888, 907 (La. 2013). 
 118. Compare Donnelly, 415 So. 2d at 479–80 (acknowledging that 
corporations and shareholders are distinct from one another and inquiring as to 
whether the shareholder owed a personal duty to the plaintiff to determine tortious 
personal fault), with Ogea, 130 So. 3d at 895–907 (creating a test and factors to 
be used in analyzing Louisiana Revised Statutes section 12:1320). 
 119. Ogea, 130 So. 3d at 894–95 (citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 24 (2013)). The 
Court acknowledged that members can be held liable for debts of the business if 
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recited the statutory interpretation guidelines to set up the framework for 
its purportedly conservative statutory interpretation,120 stating that 
Subsection A provides for the LLC chapter to exclusively govern the 
personal liability of members.121 According to the Court, the statute creates 
a “general rule” of limited liability for members for the debts, obligations, 
and liabilities of the LLC in Subsection B, with exceptions to that shield 
listed in Subsection D.122 To find a member personally liable for the debts 
of an LLC, according to the Court, the claimant must (1) be “a person who 
‘by law’ has a cause of action against [the member] individually” and (2) 
have obtained that cause of action as a result of “‘any fraud practiced upon 
[him or her]’ or ‘any breach of professional duty or other negligent or 
wrongful act.’”123 
1. The Fraud Exception 
The analysis then turned to the first “exception” to a member’s limited 
liability—fraud. The Court used a definition of fraud from the obligations 
section of the Civil Code, but found that the record lacked any evidence 
showing that Merritt committed fraud because Ogea did not enter into 
evidence the insurance policy at issue.124  
                                                                                                             
a claimant proves a “veil-piercing” theory; however, the Court quickly dismissed 
this discussion because neither party nor the lower courts discussed this issue. Id. 
at 895. 
 120. See id. at 896 (“Within our civil law system, the starting point in the 
interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. Words and phrases 
shall be read in context and shall be construed according to the common and 
approved usage of the language.” (citations omitted)). The word “conservative” 
as used in this sentence means “traditional” in the sense that the Court stated it 
should look only to the text of the statute to provide an interpretation. 
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. at 896–97. Although there may be other exceptions to personal 
liability elsewhere in the LLC chapter, the Court limited this opinion to the 
“exceptions” listed in Section D, just as the trial court and Third Circuit had done 
in the case. Id. at 897. Other exceptions may include, for example, liability for 
unlawful distributions, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1328 (2010), and failure to 
make required contributions, id. § 12:1322. 
 123. Ogea, 130 So. 3d at 897 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1320(D)). 
 124. Id. at 897–98. The Court additionally implied that the insurance policy 
probably would not have provided coverage for the damage anyway, so Ogea 
suffered no harm. See id. at 898. 
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2. The Breach of Professional Duty Exception 
The next exception the Court analyzed was whether Merritt breached 
a professional duty.125 The key question was whether contractors are 
considered “professionals” within the LLC chapter.126 Despite the 
question’s importance,127 the Court chose not to provide an answer.128 
Instead, the Court illustrated how the word “professional” had a clearly 
defined meaning in business entity law, listing the professions for which 
professional corporation statutes have been enacted.129 Although Ogea 
argued that contractors should be equated to the other traditional 
professions and subjected to the professional duty standards, the Court 
avoided the question by noting that the LLC held the contractor’s license, 
not Merritt personally.130 The Court again found the record void of any 
evidence showing that Merritt himself was a professional.131  
3. The “Negligent or Wrongful Act” Exception 
The Court then moved to its final exception to limited liability—a 
“negligent or wrongful act.”132 This portion of its analysis began by 
rejecting Merritt’s argument that the words “negligent or wrongful act” as 
                                                                                                             
 125. Id. 
 126. The question of whether a certain occupation should be considered a 
profession has never been an issue in corporate law because each chapter of the 
professional corporation statutes pertains to only one specifically named 
profession. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:807(D) (found in the professional 
law corporation chapter); id. § 12:907(C) (same language in the professional 
medical corporation statute). 
 127. See, e.g., Matherne v. Barnum, 94 So. 3d 782, 788 (La. Ct. App. 2012); 
Regions Bank v. Ark-La-Tex Water Gardens, L.L.C., 997 So. 2d 734, 740 (La. 
Ct. App. 2008); W.J. Spano Co. v. Mitchell, 943 So. 2d 1131, 1132 (La. Ct. App. 
2006). For more recent cases directly addressing this issue, see Syzygy 
Construction, L.L.C. v. McKey, 156 So. 3d 763, 768–69 (La. Ct. App. 2014), and 
Nunez v. Pinnacle Homes, L.L.C., 158 So. 3d 71, 75–77 (La. Ct. App. 2014). 
 128. The Court later answered the question by stating that contractors are not 
professionals in the LLC context. See Nunez v. Pinnacle Homes, L.L.C., No. 
2015-C-0087, 2015 WL 5972529 (La. Oct. 14, 2015). 
 129. Ogea, 130 So. 3d at 898–99. The “traditional” professions contemplated 
by the professional corporation chapters are: lawyers, medical doctors, dentists, 
accountants, chiropractors, nurses, architects, optometrists, psychologists, 
veterinarians, and architectural engineers. See id. 
 130. Ogea, 130 So. 3d at 899. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
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used in Revised Statutes section 12:1320(D) mean simply a tort.133 The 
Court stated that although the terms are commonly used in tort law, they 
are also used in criminal law, mineral law, and court reporter bond laws.134 
The Court pronounced four factors to guide lower courts in analyzing the 
“negligent or wrongful act” exception:  
1) [W]hether a member’s conduct could be fairly characterized as 
a traditionally recognized tort [the tort factor]; 2) whether a 
member’s conduct could be fairly characterized as a crime, for 
which a natural person, not a juridical person, could be held 
culpable [the criminal conduct factor]; 3) whether the conduct at 
issue was required by, or was in furtherance of, a contract between 
the claimant and the LLC [the contract factor]; and 4) whether the 
conduct at issue was done outside the member’s capacity as a 
member [the capacity factor].135 
Favoring a fact-intensive inquiry, the Court required each case to be 
decided on its specific facts and for courts to analyze all of the factors in 
their decisions.136 Thus, one factor may be dispositive of personal liability 
in one case but not in others. A court is not bound to base its decision on 
whether a member should be personally liable on the existence of any one 
of the enumerated factors in every case.137 
a. The Tort Factor 
The Court first turned to the “tort factor.” Under this factor, the 
commission of a tort by an LLC member “weighs in favor of” the 
“negligent or wrongful act” exception.138 Although explaining that the tort 
factor could weigh in favor of personal liability for a member, the Court 
quoted a case assessing personal tort liability for a corporate shareholder 
and acknowledged that shareholders are liable for any personal torts they 
commit if they owe a personal duty to the victim.139 The Court then 
inexplicably stated that LLC members should not be treated differently 
                                                                                                             
 133. Id. at 900. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. at 900–01. 
 136. Id. at 905; but see Hodge v. Strong Built Int’l, LLC, 159 So. 3d 1159 (La. 
Ct. App. 2015) (ignoring the criminal conduct and contract factors). 
 137. Ogea, 130 So. 3d at 114.  
 138. Id. at 901. 
 139. Id. (quoting H. B. “Buster” Hughes, Inc. v. Bernard, 318 So. 2d 9, 12 (La. 
1975)). 
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than corporate shareholders when determining personal liability after 
overtly doing exactly that.140  
The opinion next held that, when analyzing the tort factor, courts 
should focus on whether the member owes a personal tort duty to the 
alleged victim.141 The duty cannot be merely a contractual duty to do 
quality work, however, otherwise the general rule for limited liability 
would be negated in many cases.142 The Court was unclear whether a 
person must prove all of the elements of a traditional tort or simply 
establish a personal tort duty for this factor to be present.143 Finally, despite 
saying that no factors were always dispositive, the Court also stated that 
the tort factor may be dispositive because finding that a member breached 
a personal tort duty owed to the claimant could be enough to “pave the 
way to a member’s personal liability for the tort.”144  
Under the facts of this case, however, the Court found no evidence that 
Merritt owed any personal tort duty to Ogea.145 According to the Court, 
holding a member liable for poor workmanship arising out of the LLC’s 
contract does not alone establish a negligent or wrongful act because doing 
so would “negate the general rule of limited liability.”146 The Court held 
that the tort factor was not present because Ogea proved only poor 
workmanship.147 
                                                                                                             
 140. Id. (quoting MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 5, § 44.06, at 495). This 
particular portion of the Court’s analysis is ironic. It cites a corporate case that 
commands shareholders be held liable for their torts for the proposition that an 
LLC member’s tort should merely weigh in favor of personal liability. 
Additionally, the Court’s statement that members and shareholders should have 
the same personal liability is extremely ironic considering the test the Court is 
creating is substantially different from the analysis used in corporate cases. 
 141. Id. at 901–02. 
 142. Id. at 902. 
 143. Id. at 901. (“Of course, a claimant must prove all elements of a claim to 
succeed in a tort action. Applying . . . tort law, when examining whether a member 
of an LLC can be personally liable in tort, the threshold question to be asked 
regarding the member is therefore: ‘Was any duty of care owed to plaintiff (was 
it a foreseeable risk)?’” (emphasis added)). This point will be examined further 
infra Part IV.A.3.a. 
 144. Ogea, 130 So. 3d at 905. The Court also recognizes that an order of 
restitution by a criminal court after a conviction may also make the criminal factor 
dispositive. Id. at 905 n.14.  
 145. Id. at 905. 
 146. Id. at 905–06. 
 147. Id. at 906. 
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b. The Criminal Conduct Factor 
The Court went on to explain the “criminal conduct factor.” According 
to the Court, if the member’s conduct “constitutes a crime, that fact weighs 
in favor of the ‘negligent or wrongful act’ exception,” which in turn favors 
a finding of personal liability.148 Ogea limited the crimes to which a court 
may look at to those that a natural person, rather than solely a juridical 
person, could commit.149 Considering crimes for which only juridical 
persons could be guilty would thwart the general rule of shielding an LLC 
member from the business’s debts.150  
As its first justification for why criminal conduct should favor 
personal liability, the Court said that a victim of a crime may be granted 
restitution and that shielding a criminal from that liability simply because 
he was a member of an LLC would be inequitable.151 As an example, the 
Court demonstrated how licensing requirements could weigh in favor of 
personal liability for members.152 Under the Court’s test, an LLC member 
who acts as a contractor without a proper license would be more likely to 
be personally liable for debts of the business.153  
As the second justification for the factor, the Court stated that criminal 
statutes sometimes provide the basis for tort duties.154 The explanation 
began with odd language stating that when a civil claimant proves that a 
member’s criminal conduct creates a “right of recovery,” the situation 
“weighs in favor of” finding personal liability.155 Even so, the Court 
explained that the member does not have to have been actually convicted 
of the crime to establish the factor.156 According to the Court, Subsection 
D does not require a claimant to have already obtained a legal remedy, but 
rather only requires a claimant to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence the existence of a right—not a remedy—that he or she may have 
against the member.157 The Court clarified this ambiguous language by 
stating that its true intent was to allow courts to use a criminal statute as a 
                                                                                                             
 148. Id. at 902. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id.  
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. at 902–03. “Engaging in the business of contracting without authority” 
is a misdemeanor crime. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:2160 (2010). 
 153. Ogea, 130 So. 3d at 902–03.  
 154. Id. at 903–04 (quoting Gugliuzza v. K.C.M.C., Inc., 606 So. 2d 790, 793 
(La. 1992)). 
 155. Id. at 903. 
 156. Id.  
 157. Id.  
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“civil duty” in a tort analysis to determine personal liability.158 The Court 
did not require that the crime be the cause of any damage but did state that 
the crime must be “related” to the damage.159 The Court quickly dismissed 
the presence of the crime factor in this case because Ogea made no 
allegations that Merritt engaged in any criminal conduct.160 
c. The Contract Factor 
Under the Court’s “contract factor,” a member is less likely to be 
found personally liable for a debt or obligation of the business if his or her 
conduct “was required by, or was in furtherance of, a contract between the 
claimant and the LLC.”161 The rationale for this factor is that, under 
Subsection B, members should not be liable for an obligation of the 
LLC.162 Thus, according to the Court, if the member acts to satisfy one of 
these obligations, he or she should be more likely to qualify for limited 
liability.163 Here, the Court found that Merritt’s actions in preparing the 
dirt and supervising the construction were taken in furtherance of the 
contract between Merritt LLC and Ogea.164 The contract factor, therefore, 
weighed against personal liability for Merritt.  
d. The Capacity Factor 
The final of the Court’s four factors under the “negligent or wrongful 
act” exception is the “factor of acting inside or outside the LLC.”165 Under 
this factor, actions taken “outside” of an LLC owner’s capacity as a 
member weigh in favor of personal liability.166 To illustrate this factor, the 
                                                                                                             
 158. Id. at 903–04 (quoting Gugliuzza, 606 So. 2d at 793). 
 159. Id. at 903 n.13 (“Unrelated criminal conduct is simply irrelevant and 
cannot advance a claimant’s burden of proving that an exception to limited 
liability applies. Drawing as an example a variant from the facts of this case, we 
would be hard pressed to see how a member receiving a traffic citation one day 
on the way to the job site would breach a duty owed to a landowner who 
contracted with the member’s LLC for construction of a home.”). 
 160. Id. at 906. 
 161. Id. at 904. 
 162. Id.  
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. at 906. 
 165. This factor will be referred to as the “capacity factor” throughout this 
Comment. 
 166. Id. at 904 (quoting Petch v. Humble, 939 So. 2d 499, 504 (La. Ct. App. 
2006)). 
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Court chose to use the “principal-mandatary” relationship.167 Ogea stated 
that if a member becomes a mandatary for the claimant and breaches any 
of its duties owed to the claimant as principal, the member could become 
personally liable for the breach because he was acting as a mandatary for 
the claimant, not as a member of the LLC.168  
The Court’s second example considers a scenario where a member 
acts as an undisclosed agent for the LLC. The opinion states that when a 
member–agent fails to disclose that he is acting on behalf of the LLC, the 
member can become “personally liable for the contracts that he negotiates 
on his principal’s behalf”169 because he or she is “acting ‘outside’ the 
structure of an LLC.”170 Both of these examples tip the scales toward a 
finding of personal liability for the member, but only after weighing the 
other three factors as well.171 
As to this factor, the Court found that Merritt was acting in his capacity 
as a member at all relevant times, which weighed against finding him 
personally liable for the damage to the home.172 Ogea knew that the 
contract was between herself and Merritt LLC, not Merritt personally; 
therefore, no issue existed as to whether Merritt was acting as an 
undisclosed mandatary or outside of his capacity as a member.173 
4. Limitations and Holding 
In concluding its opinion, the Court was careful to limit its application. 
Ogea stated that members can still personally obligate themselves to a 
contract, which would always result in personal liability if the member 
breached that contract.174 The Court also stated that parties to construction 
contracts may still secure performance bonds to protect the client if the 
contract is not completed satisfactorily.175 The Court then reversed the 
portion of the appellate court decision holding Merritt personally liable for 
the damage to the home and affirmed the remainder of the issues on 
appeal.176 
                                                                                                             
 167. Id. at 904–05. 
 168. Id. at 904.  
 169. Id. at 905 (quoting MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 5, § 33.04, at 105–06). 
 170. Id.  
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. at 906. 
 173. Id.  
 174. Id. at 907. 
 175. Id.  
 176. Id.  
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The Court’s opinion interprets Revised Statutes section 12:1320 as 
providing both a general rule of limited liability in Subsection B and 
exceptions to that rule for the theories listed in Subsection D.177 Ogea 
creates four factors for determining whether particular actions of a 
member constitute one of the exceptions to limited liability.178 Despite its 
best efforts to clear up this area of law, the Court created immense 
uncertainty and confusion for LLC members trying to anticipate the 
circumstances under which they may be held personally liable when acting 
in connection with the LLC. 
IV. MISGUIDED STATUTORY DRAFTING LEADS TO MISGUIDED 
INTERPRETATION  
The legislature’s attempt at an overly protective statute led the 
Louisiana Supreme Court to create an ambiguous and uncertain test for 
determining the personal liability of LLC members. The Court attempted 
to perform a restrained statutory analysis only to misinterpret the statute 
and to insert in its place the Court’s own “four factor” test, which calls for 
lower courts to combine the policies of numerous distinct bodies of law in 
an indeterminate manner. This misinterpretation partially is due to the 
overly broad and ambiguous scope of Revised Statutes section 12:1320. 
Applying the Supreme Court’s exceptions and factors may lead to 
situations in which a court may impose personal liability when it otherwise 
should not or, conversely, situations in which a court may not impose 
personal liability when it otherwise should. In addition, Ogea created 
numerous policy issues needing resolution. Regardless of its genesis, the 
Ogea decision clearly creates a myriad of problems for LLC owners, most 
importantly uncertainty as to their exposure of personal liability in 
conducting business.  
A. How the Problems with Revised Statutes Section 12:1320 Led to Ogea 
The Supreme Court’s Ogea decision has led to a huge disparity 
between the state’s LLC law and traditional limited liability law. The 
legislature’s drafting of Revised Statutes section 12:1320 led to the 
problems with the Supreme Court’s overall general rule–exception 
framework, and the Court’s exceptions and factors have created specific 
issues that the legislature did not anticipate.  
                                                                                                             
 177. Id. at 896–97. 
 178. Id. at 900–01. 
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1. The Overreaching Drafting of Revised Statutes Section 12:1320 
The drafters of Revised Statutes section 12:1320 attempted to make 
the statute more inclusive than necessary from the start. Subsections A and 
B state that the LLC chapter of the Revised Statutes exclusively governs 
the personal liability of “members, managers, employees, [and] agents” of 
LLCs.179 The legislature’s attempt, however, to determine the liability of 
managers, employees, and agents is unnecessary. A correct application of 
the traditional limited liability shield only protects members from personal 
liability for debts or obligations of the business that arise solely because 
they are owners.180 Applying the shield to non-owners of the business is 
unnecessary because no “tenet of law” exists to extend liability to those 
categories of people for debts of the business in the first place.181 In 
contrast, both the old and new versions of the corporate statute purport to 
determine the liability only of corporate shareholders, not anyone else 
associated with the corporation.182 The original language of the statute 
shows how protective the drafters intended the statute to be. Although the 
legislature may have fixed one problem with its language, the remaining 
concerns surrounding the statute not nearly resolved. 
Another example of the legislature’s overreaching attempt to cover all 
possible personal liability theories can be seen in Revised Statutes section 
12:1320’s original language. Without the scope-limiting language “as 
such” and “in such capacity” in Subsections A and B, the first version of 
the statute provided only that LLC law exclusively determines the liability 
of LLC members at all times.183 Under this language, whether a member, 
                                                                                                             
 179. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1320 (2010). 
 180. See supra Part I.B. 
 181. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 13, ¶ 6.01[4]; see also LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 12:1-140(15C)(a) (2015) (defining “owner liability” as “personal 
liability for a debt, obligation, or liability of a domestic or foreign business or 
nonprofit corporation or unincorporated entity that is imposed . . . [s]olely by 
reason of the person’s status as a shareholder, partner, member, or interest 
holder”). 
 182. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-622(B); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:93 (2010) 
(repealed 2014).  
 183. Act No. 475, 1993 La. Acts 1177, 1183. The original language of the 
statute is reproduced below with the amended portions in brackets: 
A. The liability of members, managers, employees, or agents[, as such,] 
of a limited liability company . . . shall at all times be determined solely 
and exclusively by the provisions of this Chapter. 
B. Except as otherwise specifically set forth in this Chapter, no member, 
manager, employee, or agent of a limited liability company is liable [in 
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employee, manager, or agent of an LLC could be liable for personal 
obligations, such as a home mortgage was unclear, because nothing in the 
LLC provisions created liability for these categories of people for any 
personal contracts.184 To quell these concerns, the legislature added the 
words “as such” and “in such capacity” so that now the statute “governs 
exclusively unless it doesn’t.”185  
The exclusivity provision of Revised Statutes section 12:1320 is also 
responsible for many of the statute’s shortcomings.186 The language is 
unnecessary because the legislature had no reason to attempt to place all 
possible theories of personal liability into a single statutory provision. 
Corporate law makes no attempt to do so, and courts consistently find 
shareholders personally liable for their own liabilities and debts without 
even referring to the corporate limited liability provision.187 The courts 
reach this result by leaving the determination of personal liability—
outside of piercing the corporate veil—to other bodies of law that give rise 
to personal liability for shareholders.188 
Despite the legislature’s apparent best efforts to create a pro-business 
statute that limits the liability of those associated with LLCs to the furthest 
extent possible, the superfluous language has actually backfired and 
created much uncertainty for LLC members. The unnecessary language 
forced the Supreme Court to generate a new test in Ogea that potentially 
destroys one of the most important advantages the entity is designed to 
offer. 
2. The Overreaching Language Leads to Ogea’s General Rule-
Exception Framework 
In Ogea, the Court’s general rule of no liability and three exceptions—
fraud, breach of professional duty, and negligent or wrongful acts—derive 
                                                                                                             
such capacity] for a debt, obligation, or liability of the limited liability 
company. 
Id.; see also supra Part II. 
 184. See MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 5, § 44.06, at 495. 
 185. See id. 
 186. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 187. Courts consistently find liability for personal contractual obligations, 
under agency principles, see, e.g., C.T. Traina Plumbing & Heating Contractors, 
Inc. v. Palmer, 580 So. 2d 525 (La. Ct. App. 1991), and for tort liability, U.S. Fid. 
& Guar. Co. v. Ledford, 244 So. 2d 252 (La. Ct. App. 1971); see also MORRIS & 
HOLMES, supra note 5, §§ 33.01 to 33.13. 
 188. See supra Part I.B (providing an application of the limited liability 
shield). 
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from language found in Revised Statutes section 12:1320.189 Ideally, the 
Court would not have viewed the no-derogation provision in Subsection 
D as creating exceptions but instead would have treated that provision as 
referring to separate and distinct legal theories. The reason for the Court’s 
use of these separate causes of action as exceptions and its creation of 
factors, however, is readily apparent. Because the statute commanded the 
Court not to look outside of LLC laws when determining personal liability, 
the Court sought to ensure that members and others associated with an 
LLC could not escape personal liability simply because the statute did not 
expressly provide for liability under a particular theory. In an attempt to 
preserve liability for members, employees, managers, and agents under all 
of the traditional theories of recovery, the Court combined several bodies 
of law into one indeterminate and confusing test. In actuality, each of the 
“exceptions” and the four “negligent or wrongful act” factors are 
standalone legal theories that should result in personal liability for an LLC 
member without reference to a framework or test, as they would under 
corporate law.190 
The source of the Court’s “exceptions”—Subsection D—is 
completely unnecessary, making the Court’s erroneous interpretation even 
more frustrating. The legislature simply copied the no-derogation 
provision from the professional corporations statutes to avoid an apparent 
disconnect.191 The provision was only placed in the professional 
corporation statutes to ensure that liability for professionals would not 
change simply because they were providing services through a corporate, 
limited liability entity.192 Essentially, the legislature wanted to assure the 
public that professionals, such as doctors and lawyers, would still be liable 
for malpractice despite performing their services through a corporation—
which would have been true even without this language.193 The statutory 
                                                                                                             
 189. See Ogea v. Merritt, 130 So. 3d 888, 896–97 (La. 2013). 
 190. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 28, § 12:4; supra Part IV.A.3; 
supra Part I.B (explaining that the limited liability shield does not protect owners 
from personal liability from their own personal conduct). 
 191. See supra Part II.  
 192. See MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 5, § 42.06, at 454–55. The no-
derogation provision does not tempt courts to treat the theories of recovery as 
“exceptions” in the professional corporation context because those statutes do not 
contain an exclusivity provision. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:807 (2010). 
 193. Just as non-professional corporate shareholders remain liable for the torts 
they commit in connection with their businesses, professionals remain liable for 
malpractice despite performing their services through a corporation. See, e.g., LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:807(C); see also MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 5, § 42.06, 
at 454–55. 
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preservation is superfluous because the limited liability shield does not 
protect from this type of personal obligation in the first place.194 
Similarly, the duplication of this language in the LLC statute is not 
necessary because Subsection B purports to shield members only from 
liability for debts or obligations of the LLC.195 On the other hand, 
Subsection D and the professional corporations statutes attempt to do 
nothing more than preserve a member or shareholder’s personal liability 
for their own debts and obligations. The provisions preserve rights that a 
claimant may have “against a member” and are silent as to any rights that 
the person may have against the LLC.196 Clearly, this subsection is 
excessive because no statute attempts to limit the liability that it preserves 
in the first place.  
Further, the theories of liability the Court used to formulate its 
exceptions and factors are, in fact, not exceptions to the limited liability 
shield at all. They are completely separate and distinct theories of recovery 
that create personal liability for the member because of his or her own 
actions, not liability for a debt of the entity.197 The key inquiry is whether 
the member would be liable if he or she were simply an employee or agent 
of the LLC and not an owner.198 This inquiry is much clearer as articulated 
in corporate law, where Revised Statutes section 12:1-622 simply states 
that shareholders are not liable for the debts of the corporation.199 No 
interpretation problems exist there because the statute does not contain a 
no-derogation provision preserving liability for any theory or limiting a 
shareholder’s personal liability to a particular chapter of the Revised 
Statutes.200 
                                                                                                             
 194. See supra Part I.B. 
 195. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1320(B) (“Except as otherwise specifically set 
forth in this Chapter, no member, manager, employee, or agent of a limited 
liability company is liable in such capacity for a debt, obligation, or liability of 
the limited liability company.”). 
 196. Id. § 12:1320(D) (emphasis added). 
 197. These theories include torts, contracts, agency, and other traditional 
theories of recovery. See supra Part I.B. 
 198. See supra Part I.B. 
 199. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-622(B) (2015). 
 200. In cases adjudicating the personal liability of corporate shareholders, 
courts proceed directly to these traditional theories of recovery without having to 
analyze a statute or navigate any test. See, e.g., H. B. “Buster” Hughes, Inc. v. 
Bernard, 318 So. 2d 9 (La. 1975) (analyzing tort liability of a corporate 
shareholder); Chaney v. Godfrey, 535 So. 2d 918 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (analyzing 
liability of corporate shareholders under agency theories); Donnelly v. Handy, 
415 So. 2d 478 (La. Ct. App. 1982). 
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Take, for example, the breach of professional duty exception. A 
member is liable for his or her own torts regardless of whether the actions 
are committed in connection with the business.201 A breach of a 
professional duty should result in a malpractice claim against the member, 
and he or she should be held personally liable to the third party as a 
tortfeasor regardless of the member’s status as owner.202 The limited 
liability protections merely shield a member from liability for debts of the 
business and so are not implicated because the professional is personally 
liable for his own misconduct. 
Based on the language of the statute, the idea that the legislature 
intended for courts to use the reservations in Subsection D as an exclusive 
list of exceptions to the limited liability shield seems plausible. What 
seems more likely is that the statute was simply an overreaching attempt 
to protect members from personal liability in situations to which the 
limited liability shield would normally not apply. The legislature likely—
and unwisely—was attempting to make holding a person connected with 
an LLC personally liable for any act taken in connection with the business 
impossible.203 But the legislature, feeling compelled to include Subsection 
D’s no-derogation provision, created another possible interpretation. 
Interpreting Subsection D as providing a list of exceptions to a general rule 
rather than separate theories of liability results in an analysis out of touch 
with the plain meaning of the statute and traditional limited liability law. 
In that sense, almost all of the Court’s interpretation misconstrues the 
plain language of Revised Statutes section 12:1320, although the language 
itself does not conform to the traditional scope of the limited liability 
shield. The no-liability provision—Subsection B—does not create a 
“general” or absolute rule against members for personal liability for 
actions taken in connection with the business; rather, that provision merely 
protects them from personal liability for debts of the business. The no-
derogation provision, instead of providing exceptions to the no-liability 
provision, merely states that the statute should not affect a member’s 
liability for his personal actions, seemingly clarifying the scope of 
Subsection B. When the exclusivity provision is added to the equation, 
however, the reason why the Court chose to create the Ogea test becomes 
obvious—to preserve the typical theories under which owners of limited 
liability entities can become personally liable for actions taken in 
connection with the business.  
                                                                                                             
 201. See supra Part I.B. 
 202. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 28, § 12:4; see also supra Part I.B. 
 203. Of course, this cannot be true as these people can clearly be held 
personally liable under other bodies of law—for instance, tort. See supra Part I.B. 
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In essence, the Court had two evils to evaluate: (1) interpret the plain 
language of the statute correctly and (2) leave gaps in personal liability 
from the statute’s poor drafting or misinterpret the language in an attempt 
to cover all theories of personal liability. Had the Court interpreted the 
plain language of the statute correctly, a member would not become liable 
for, say, acting as an undisclosed agent because nothing in the LLC chapter 
of the Revised Statutes imposes liability on a member for that type of 
action. Therefore, the Court was essentially forced to house all of these 
theories in one test under the statute. Although the Court may have acted 
with the best of intentions, the new analysis is legally unsound and creates 
numerous potentially incorrect applications. 
3. The Negligent or Wrongful Act Factors 
In addition to the issues with the overall framework, many problems 
are specifically presented within the negligent or wrongful act exception. 
The Court’s use of separate forms of liability as mere factors weakens the 
legal effects of those theories. For instance, if a claimant can prove all 
elements of a tort or has a restitution claim against a member of an LLC, 
the claimant should be able to bring the claim and succeed in recovery. 
Under Ogea, however, the tort or crime is now just one part of a four-
factor test, so proof of the theory of recovery will not automatically result 
in liability for the member. Other than the general problems that result 
from using standalone legal theories as “factors,” each of the “factors” 
present unique complications. 
a. The Tort Factor 
Much of what the Court says about the tort factor is correct under the 
traditional limited liability shield—specifically the focus on the presence 
of a personal tort duty. Besides a tort actually being a separate legal theory, 
two problems with this factor persist. First, the Court is unclear as to 
whether a claimant must prove all elements of tort or only a duty and 
breach. Making the tort analysis merely a “factor” implies that a claimant 
should not have to prove all elements of a tort to find the factor present. If 
the Court intended to require claimants to establish all elements of a tort, 
no justification would exist to make torts a “factor” and not deem them 
standalone theories of recovery. If proof of only a duty and a breach of 
that duty is necessary, however, a court could hold a member personally 
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liable without the claimant having to prove an entire legal theory upon 
which to impose the liability.204  
Second, the Court should have been more careful when discussing the 
legal ramifications of Merritt’s poor workmanship. The Court did not find 
the tort factor present because Ogea only proved poor workmanship 
arising out of a contract, which amounts to a breach of contract, not a 
tort.205 Poor workmanship may, however, constitute a tort if the actor is a 
professional; in those situations, poor workmanship becomes malpractice 
because professionals owe a special tort duty to their hirers.206 For 
example, if a doctor or lawyer performs his or her work poorly, that doctor 
may become liable for malpractice as a tort, even though the doctor is 
actually acting in furtherance of a contract with a client or patient.207 This 
tort is a result of the professional duty, and without that professional duty 
in Ogea, the Court correctly determined that no tort had occurred.  
b. The Criminal Conduct Factor 
The criminal conduct factor is equally perplexing. The Court uses two 
misguided justifications for the factor and does not require the crime to be 
the cause of the claimant’s damages. First, the Court was unclear what 
legal theory creates the basis for finding liability under this factor. Using 
a criminal statute as a standard for determining a duty as part of a tort 
analysis does not justify another “factor.” Instead, a court could simply fit 
the criminal statute into its tort analysis and hold the defendant personally 
liable under tort law or find the tort factor present. Further, if the criminal 
statute at issue in a given case expressly provides for restitution, then a 
court should use that statute rather than Revised Statutes section 12:1320 
to provide a basis for the member’s personal liability because the statute 
                                                                                                             
 204. Additionally, the Court used unfortunate language in its first listing of the 
negligent or wrongful act factors when it stated that one of the factors is whether 
the conduct “could be fairly characterized as a traditionally recognized tort.” Ogea 
v. Merritt, 130 So. 3d 888, 900 (La. 2013). This language seems to suggest that 
the Court requires only proof of “tort-like” conduct, without proof of an actual 
tort duty, or other elements of a prima facie case, to find the tort factor present. 
This may seem like a trivial point because the Court clarified that at least a tort 
duty and breach were required. Subsequent decisions, however, have quoted only 
this “tort-like” language when analyzing the negligent or wrongful act exception 
and stated nothing about a tort duty. See, e.g., Nunez v. Pinnacle Homes, L.L.C., 
158 So. 3d 71, 77 (La. Ct. App. 2014) (Amy, J., dissenting).  
 205. Ogea, 130 So. 3d at 905–06. 
 206. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 160 (2010). 
 207. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:807(C) (2010); see also MORRIS & 
HOLMES, supra note 5, § 42.06, at 454–55. 
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in no way limits the member’s liability for personal debts and 
obligations.208 Using a restitution provision in a criminal statute or using a 
statute as a “duty” in a tort analysis are completely separate theories of 
recovery housed outside of business entity law, not “exceptions” to the 
limited liability shield or “factors” in any analysis. These theories should 
have no place in an analysis under Revised Statutes section 12:1320. In 
addition, the Court only stated that the case and crime should be “related” 
but did not require the crime to be the cause of the harm.209 This ambiguity 
could result in crimes only tangentially related to the harm serving as the 
basis of personal liability for an LLC member. 
c. The Contract and Capacity Factors 
Like the tort and criminal conduct factors, the Court’s contract and 
capacity factors should not be conceptualized as factors because they are 
standalone theories of recovery. The contract factor represents the Court’s 
attempt to prevent a member from being liable for breaches of duties that 
the LLC owes to the claimant pursuant to a contract to which it alone is a 
party.210 The capacity factor is simply an attempt by the Court to ensure 
that its new framework covers agency theories—such as undisclosed 
mandate—and obligations that a member personally guarantees or those 
for which he or she personally contracts. A court’s focus, however, should 
not be on what “capacity” the member was acting in, but whether the 
member or other affiliated person owed any personal duties to the 
claimant.211 The language of Revised Statutes section 12:1320 again led 
the Court to include these theories as mere factors in what it views as a 
universal scheme of personal liability for members. 
                                                                                                             
 208. The Court’s decision to use the contractor’s licensing statute to illustrate 
the “criminal conduct” factor is also troubling. The relevant statute does not itself 
provide for restitution, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:2160 (2007 & Supp. 2015), and 
the Court does not state that the statute would be used as a tort “duty.” Ogea, 130 
So. 3d at 902–03. The Court essentially created a new theory of liability based on 
an ill-defined way on the premise that an LLC member violated a criminal statute. 
 209. Ogea, 130 So. 3d at 903 n.13.  
 210. See, e.g., Donnelly v. Handy, 415 So. 2d 478, 482 (La. Ct. App. 1982) 
(holding that a corporate shareholder was not personally liable for the poor work 
he completed in furtherance of his corporation’s contract because the corporation 
had the contractual duty, not the shareholder); Regions Bank v. Ark-La-Tex Water 
Gardens, L.L.C., 997 So. 2d 734, 742 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (Caraway, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 211. See supra Part I.B; supra Part III.A.2 (discussing cases using the 
“capacity” factor). 
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Further, the Court’s undisclosed agency example is troublesome.212 A 
traditional analysis would simply show that under the law of mandate, the 
member is personally liable for the contractual duty because the member 
acted as an undisclosed agent.213 Failure to disclose his or her status as an 
agent is the cause of liability, not the capacity in which the person was 
acting.214 Revised Statutes section 12:1320 is not implicated in these 
situations because the member is being held liable for a personal debt, not 
one belonging to the business. The problems with these two factors, along 
with the other factors and exceptions, create immense uncertainty and 
potentially lead to extreme misapplications of the traditional limited 
liability shield. 
B. Potential Applications of the Court’s Ruling 
The problems with the statute and opinion become even more apparent 
when analyzing potential applications of the Court’s test. Under certain 
circumstances, a court may find no personal liability for a member under 
Ogea when that member normally would become liable under traditional 
legal theories. For example, consider a situation where a member making 
a delivery for his LLC strikes a pedestrian with his automobile.215 The 
member owes a personal duty to the pedestrian not to hit her. If the 
pedestrian can prove the remaining elements of a tort, then under 
traditional limited liability law, the member will be personally liable to the 
pedestrian for the damages he causes in the accident, regardless of his 
ownership interest.216 Limited liability under Revised Statutes section 
12:1320(B) is not implicated because the liability is personal and not a 
liability of the business. 
But, under the Ogea analysis, a court would have to determine whether 
an “exception” to limited liability was met. Analyzing the “negligent or 
wrongful act” exception, the “tort” factor would be present. The member, 
however, did not commit any crime, was acting in furtherance of the 
                                                                                                             
 212. Ogea, 130 So. 3d at 905. 
 213. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2320 (2015); see also MORRIS & HOLMES, supra 
note 5, § 33.04, at 105–07. 
 214. An undisclosed agent may in fact be acting in his capacity as an agent of 
the LLC, but the third party has no knowledge of that, hence the resulting personal 
liability. Further, a tortfeasor employee may be acting in his capacity as an 
employee, but should still be liable in an automobile accident that his negligence 
caused. See Narcise v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 427 So. 2d 1192, 1194 (La. 1983); 
see also CRAWFORD, supra note 42, § 8:2, at 134–35. 
 215. See supra Part I.B. 
 216. See supra Part I.B. 
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LLC’s contract to deliver the package, and was acting in his capacity as 
member and employee of the LLC. Three factors would weigh against 
holding the member personally liable, and one factor would weigh in favor 
of liability. Because, as the Court stated, no single factor is automatically 
dispositive, a court could easily find no personal liability existed in this 
situation even though the member should clearly be personally liable 
under traditional tort law.217 
Conversely, a court applying Ogea may find a member personally 
liable when that member would not be under traditional legal theories. For 
example, consider a member, whose driver’s license expired the previous 
day, striking a pedestrian with his car after driving through a 
malfunctioning stop light on his way home from work. Imagine that in a 
suit against the member, the claimant cannot prove causation—a required 
element in negligence tort cases218—because the city’s broken traffic light 
caused the accident. Under a proper analysis, the member would not be 
liable to the claimant because the claimant cannot prove a legal theory 
upon which to base a recovery.  
But under Ogea, a court could determine that the member’s actions 
were criminal because he was driving with an expired license, were not in 
furtherance of an LLC contract because he was going home, and were not 
taken in his capacity as a member of the LLC because he was not working. 
A court could hold a member liable for the damages by finding three out 
of four factors under the “negligent or wrongful act” exception even 
though no traditional legal theory exists under which to hold the member 
liable. Although a court may be unlikely to do this, but given that the 
claimant would have been one element short of proving a tort, this result 
is certainly possible under Ogea. Courts have the ability to weigh the 
individual factors in any way they see fit, which, as these examples 
illustrate, makes the test inherently subjective and unpredictable. However 
unlikely these potential applications may be, the uncertainty of how the 
cases would be decided is the true problem with Ogea. 
C. Policy Problems Created by Ogea 
Aside from the specific problems with the framework and factors, the 
Ogea decision creates some broader policy concerns. First and most 
                                                                                                             
 217. Although Ogea stated that the tort factor may be dispositive, a court is 
not required to find liability automatically if all of the elements of a tort are 
proven. Ogea, 130 So. 3d at 905. 
 218. See Morris v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 553 So. 2d 427, 429 (La. 1989) 
(“[T]he elements of a [tort] cause of action are fault, causation, and damage.”); 
see also CRAWFORD, supra note 42, § 4:6, at 82–84. 
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importantly, the decision creates large amounts of uncertainty for LLC 
owners, who are now unsure under what circumstances a court may hold 
them personally liable for the debts of the business. Ideally, courts would 
provide LLC members with the same certainty that they give to corporate 
shareholders—no personal liability for debts of the business unless the 
corporate veil is pierced.219 The Louisiana Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of Revised Statutes section 12:1320 casts doubt on one of the major 
advantages LLCs were intended to provide to their owners.220 
The Court’s “factor” test, which determines whether a member’s 
actions meet the “negligent or wrongful act” exception, is too ambiguous. 
This test allows courts to hold LLC members personally liable without 
fully proving any one theory of recovery.221 The test incorrectly introduces 
several completely distinct bodies of law into business entity law. When a 
court is deciding whether a member should be personally liable for his or 
her actions, that court should use the policies of that particular body of 
law, such as contracts, torts, or agency. Ogea combines all of these policies 
and doctrines into one “test.” This improper merger of unique bodies of 
law appears ill advised; in theory, a judge should have tort policies in mind 
when deciding whether a member owes a personal tort duty to a claimant, 
not contract or agency policies. The “factor” test bleeds these areas of law 
together and makes unclear under which theory a court is holding a 
member liable or if the court is finding liability without proof of all 
elements of any theory.222 
The Court’s framework of using the no-derogation provision in 
Subsection D as exceptions to a general rule of limited liability creates 
numerous problems. That framework misinterprets the plain language of 
Revised Statutes section 12:1320 and in doing so transforms numerous 
standalone theories of recovery into either an exception or one of four 
factors in a test. The language in the poorly written LLC statute is the most 
prominent cause, however, because that language led the Court to believe 
that its opinion had to encapsulate all possible theories of recovery for 
actions taken in connection with an LLC in one all-encompassing test. The 
problems with the statute, along with the Ogea decision and its potential 
applications, make changes to LLC law absolutely necessary. 
                                                                                                             
 219. Smith v. Cotton’s Fleet Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 759, 761–63 (1987); see 
also MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 5, § 33.01, at 50–52. 
 220. See supra Part I.A. 
 221. See supra Part IV.B (providing examples of potential problems with the 
factor test). 
 222. See supra Part IV.B (providing an example of how a court could find 
personal liability without proof of an entire legal theory of recovery). 
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V. WHY THE LEGISLATURE MUST MIRROR THE LLC 
AND CORPORATE STATUTES 
To alleviate the errors and concerns arising from the Supreme Court’s 
Ogea decision, the Louisiana Legislature should amend Revised Statutes 
section 12:1320 to mirror Revised Statutes section 12:1-622(B), the 
parallel corporate statute. The legislature could not have intended for 
courts to treat LLC members and shareholders differently, but the Court’s 
Ogea decision yields exactly that result. Leaving the lower courts to trudge 
through the Supreme Court’s extremely amorphous decision threatens the 
financial stability of LLC owners because of the extreme uncertainty 
surrounding the potential outcomes under the test in any number of 
scenarios. 
If the legislature were to mirror the corporate statute, lower courts could 
easily analogize to liability decisions involving corporate shareholders. No 
justification exists to treat the two entities differently with respect to owner 
liability,223 and the only reason that courts have done so is because of the 
language of Revised Statutes section 12:1320.224 LLCs pose the same risks 
to persons affected by the limited liability rule as corporations. A third party 
is not concerned with whether the business with which the third party is 
interacting with is an LLC or a corporation because the third party likely 
believes its rights against the owners of each are the same. 
Mirroring the corporate and LLC statutes would clarify to courts that 
the owners of the two business entities should be equally protected and 
would allow courts determining the personal liability of LLC owners to 
more easily use corporate cases as a guide. Because LLCs are the fastest 
growing type of entity in the state,225 this analogy would allow limited 
                                                                                                             
 223. See Ogea v. Merritt, 130 So. 3d 888, 901 (La. 2013) (“LLCs are not 
different from corporations in any sense that would justify a different approach to 
such questions of personal liability.” (quoting MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 5, 
§ 44.06, at 495)); Petch v. Humble, 939 So. 2d 499, 505 (La. Ct. App. 2006) 
(applying principles from a case analyzing personal liability of corporate 
shareholders to determine personal liability of LLC members). 
 224. See Ogea v. Merritt, 109 So. 3d 516, 522 (La. Ct. App. 2013) (holding 
that the legislature intended the two types of owners to be treated differently based 
on language in the LLC chapter); see generally Ogea, 130 So. 3d 888 (creating a 
test for member personal liability based on the language on Revised Statutes 
section 12:1320). 
 225. Chrisman, supra note 16, at 475–76 (noting that 82% of new domestic 
business filings in Louisiana were for LLCs between 2004 and 2007); Friedman, 
supra note 16, at 37 (noting that 72% of business filings in Louisiana were for 
LLCs in 2003). 
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liability shield law226 to develop even more quickly, as many more LLC 
cases are bound to appear on dockets. Mirroring the statutes would render 
most of the current jurisprudence interpreting Revised Statutes section 
12:1320 useless, providing the advantage of ridding the law of these 
incorrect applications of the limited liability shield.227 The portions of 
those decisions that were correct would still be applicable, and the portions 
that were not—such as the “general rule-exception” framework and the 
“capacity” factor—would be eliminated completely. Courts should instead 
apply the mass of prior corporate shareholder liability jurisprudence in the 
LLC context because cases have correctly determined the liability of 
corporate shareholders for years.228 
Although the intent of this amendment would be to mirror the 
corporate liability rules, removing only Subsection D—the no-derogation 
provision—could cause courts to believe that the legislature intended to 
protect LLC members from tort claims for breaches of professional duties. 
In some ways, this assumption would be reasonable because the 
preservation language would be present in the professional corporation 
statutes but removed from the LLC statutes, creating an obvious difference 
between the two. To dispel this concern, the legislature should simply add 
a reference to the professional corporation statutes in the new version of 
Revised Statutes section 12:1320.229 The ideal statute should read:  
A member of an LLC is not personally liable for the acts or debts 
of the LLC. This section does not affect the personal liability of any 
member for a breach of a professional duty if the member meets the 
qualifications for exercising share voting power in, or participating 
in the earnings of, any form of professional corporation authorized 
in Title 12.230 
                                                                                                             
 226. By providing identical statutes for both corporations and LLCs, the courts 
could easily analogize between cases involving different entity types. The result 
would be one collection of jurisprudence that applies equally to both corporate 
shareholders and LLC members, hence the designation “limited liability shield 
law.” 
 227. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the Louisiana jurisprudence pertaining 
to personal liability of LLC owners before Ogea). 
 228. See, e.g., H. B. “Buster” Hughes, Inc. v. Bernard, 318 So. 2d 9, 12 (La. 
1975); Donnelly v. Handy, 415 So. 2d 478, 482 (La. Ct. App. 1982). 
 229. This reference would also provide guidance on the question of which 
occupations are considered “professions” in the LLC chapter. 
 230. Only licensed members of the designated profession may exercise voting 
rights and share in the earnings of a professional corporation. See, e.g., LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 12:805(B)(1), :801(A)(2)(a) (2010). The incorporation of this rule 
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Additionally, comments to the statute explaining the reasons for the 
change would be helpful to alleviate any concerns that a court may hold 
an LLC member liable for an obligation of the LLC if the member commits 
malpractice. Courts would not interpret the second sentence as creating 
“exceptions” to limited liability—as in Ogea—because the exclusivity 
language from the current statute would be completely eliminated. 
There would also be no concern that courts would not be able to 
“pierce the company veil” despite the fact that veil piercing would not be 
expressly provided for in the statute. Neither the current LLC nor the 
corporate statute contains any mention of piercing the corporate veil,231 yet 
courts have regularly employed the doctrine as a theory to create personal 
liability for both shareholders and members.232 Courts have no reason to 
disregard this theory simply because it would not be in the revised version 
of Revised Statutes section 12:1320. In fact, there would be more 
justification for courts to use veil-piercing theories in LLC cases because 
the legislature would have clearly showed its intention for courts to place 
LLC members and corporate shareholders on equal footing with respect to 
liability. 
CONCLUSION 
One of the main purposes behind limited liability companies is to 
provide limited liability to members for the debts of the business. The 
Louisiana Supreme Court’s Ogea v. Merritt decision thwarts this advantage 
by circumventing the traditional method of determining personal liability of 
business owners protected by the limited liability shield. The decision is a 
direct result of the Court’s attempt to fit all possible theories of recovery into 
one test because of the legislature’s use of unnecessary language in Revised 
Statutes section 12:1320. The decision creates a vague and indeterminate 
test that combines, in undetermined portions, the policies of several bodies 
of law that should be kept separate from one another. Further, Ogea 
threatens the protections the legislature intended to provide LLC members 
                                                                                                             
into the LLC statute would ensure that the second sentence of the statute related 
to professional duties would only apply to professional LLC members. 
 231. See id. § 12:1320; id. § 12:93 (2010) (repealed 2014) (old corporate 
statute); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-622 (2015) (current corporate statute). 
 232. See, e.g., Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., 590 So. 2d 1164 (La. 1991) 
(corporate case acknowledging the ability of claimants to “pierce the corporate 
veil” and citing only case law for authority); Charming Charlie, Inc. v. Perkins 
Rowe Assocs., L.L.C., 97 So. 3d 595 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (LLC case 
acknowledging the possibility of piercing the veil of an LLC and citing only case 
law as authority). 
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and creates a mass of uncertainty for the fastest growing entity type in the 
state. 
Therefore, the Louisiana Legislature should amend Revised Statutes 
section 12:1320 to mirror its corporate counterpart, Revised Statutes 
section 12:1-622(B). This amendment would abrogate the Supreme 
Court’s Ogea decision and clarify that LLC members should be treated the 
same as corporate shareholders for purposes of personal liability. 
Louisiana courts have properly adjudicated personal liability for corporate 
shareholders previously, and analogizing LLCs to corporations would 
clear the uncertainty currently surrounding member liability. Louisiana 
has an important interest in protecting LLC members, and they should not 
be forced to put the fate of their financial livelihoods in the hands of a 
court applying a confusing and legally unsound test. 
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